















It does not seem overstated to say that the concepts 'organicism', 'formalism', 'functionalism' and 'expressionism', when applied to architecture, are usually defined in such a loose way — if they are defined at all— that their meanings dramatically vary depending on the author who uses them. Even when two such concepts are taken as opposites in the common parlance of architects, they are in many cases assigned largely overlapping contents. Since they can hardly be considered technical tools of analysis, no real need to define them in a precise way seems to be felt, even for those who develop rigorous theories of architecture.2  It is true that they are mainly used to describe a particular kind of architecture associated with a limited period in a specific context and that, in such cases, they are illustrated by a range of buildings whose main features are supposed to exemplify their content. But even then, one can expect that the specific character of this content would be defined in a useful way, especially since they tend also to be used to name the normative and more or less philosophical views which are associated with these sorts of architecture. For those who express a preference for one of these categories or another, they can even be used to characterise what should be considered a valuable piece of architecture. Indeed, in spite of the fact that the meaning of these relatively abstract philosophical concepts remains loosely defined, the corresponding adjectives are frequently applied to buildings which are said to have an 'organic' or a 'formalist' quality  by those who deem that they illustrate fairly well what they mean by such concepts. Were these concepts consistently defined, and contrasts drawn between them, they could facilitate useful discussions about the various attitudes that they are taken to convey. Put otherwise, were these concepts consistently defined, the judgements which are so frequently made with their help would become precise enough to be fruitfully debatable. Given these circumstances, it seems worthwhile to explore how these concepts relate to one another and how they could be understood in a consistent way. This paper aims to accomplish this with the help of a matrix — in which two sets of criteria are interrelated — that enables one to avoid the overlaps and the equivocations that have resulted from the common manner of opposing any two of these concepts in a loosely antithetical fashion.

Wright's 'criteria'
Of the set of concepts in question, 'organicism' is probably the one which is the most in need of a clear definition. This is hardly surprising when one considers that it has typically been employed by architects who were in the business of promoting their own architecture by using it to highlight its qualities and to implicitly contrast these with the shortcomings of other types of architecture. In this context, any piece of architecture which is judged unfitting from their point of view is considered to fall within the scope of a vaguely but negatively defined opposite concept. With his campaign for his own concept of 'organicism', Frank Lloyd Wright is the paradigmatic case of an architect promoting his own architecture, which he openly associated with modern architecture in general. In his famous George Watson Chair Lectures delivered in London in 1939, Wright did not hesitate to say: 'Modern architecture — let us now say organic architecture — is a natural architecture: the architecture of nature, for nature'.3 While Wright's unsystematic and rather general considerations on organicism were never developed as being a set of technical 'criteria', it will be useful to treat this idea of submission to nature (and to life considered as its manifestation) as a first Wrightian criterion of organicism in architecture. In contrast to organic architecture, inorganic architecture would attribute a primacy to art over life, as illustrated by 'classic' architecture which, according to Wright's rather harsh judgement, 'was more a mask for life to bear than an expression of life itself'.4 Be that as it may, to justify his organic analogy, Wright insisted that organic architecture, like a plant, develops itself from the inside out. This stands in contrast to architecture which would result from the imposition of a sculptural form to be seen from the outside without due consideration for the requirements of those living (or working) inside the building. Wright declared emphatically that he found this principle expressed perfectly by Lao Tze who, 'five hundreds years before Jesus', wrote that 'the reality of the building does not consist of walls and roof but in the space within to be lived in'.5 Wright was not the first to find this view quite congenial with organicism since, as underscored by Robert Venturi, the architectural interpretation of the idea of an organic growth from within had already been clearly emphasised by predecessors like Greenough, Thoreau and Sullivan.6  In any case, this development of the building from inside out can be considered a second Wrightian criterion of organicism. A third criterion derives more or less from the first two. Wright claims that organic architecture must be an interpretation of life because 'buildings are made for life, to be lived in and to be lived in happily, designed to contribute to that living, joy and living beauty'.7  According to Wright, organic architecture and people's happiness and satisfaction are even so closely related that 'we cannot have an organic architecture unless we achieve an organic society'.8  As emphasised by Bruno Zevi, such an organic view of architecture implies that houses should grow like plants with the 'progressively changing requirements' of their inhabitant.9 In this context, given that the famous dictum 'form follows function' was formulated by Wright's Lieber Master, Louis Sullivan, when he was himself promoting organic architecture,10 it seems appropriate to consider that the primacy of function over form constitutes a third Wrightian criterion insofar as it echoes this alleged orientation of organic architecture towards the satisfaction of the most profound human and social needs. It is true that, in his holistic mood, Wright liked to complete Sullivan's 'abused slogan' with a dictum of his own: 'form and function are one'.11 To his mind, however, this was just another way to underscore that form should never be divorced from the requirements of function.

In any case, Wright was not the first to use the organic metaphor to illustrate what architecture should be. Alberti traced it back to the Ancients when he claimed that, since they considered 'that a building is very like an Animal', they thought it appropriate for architects to imitate Nature.12 Vasari, for his part, said about a building that it seemed 'not built, but born', a phrase which brought Geoffrey Scott to comment that architecture 'must appear organic like the body'.13 It was apparently the historian Jacob Burckhardt who first applied the term 'organic' to architecture14 before the notion of organic architecture as such was evoked by the French architect Viollet-le-Duc15 and, as just mentioned, by Louis Sullivan, Wright's mentor. Be that as it may, even though it is arguable that Wright's intuitions about organicism are powerfully illustrated by some of his most successful pieces of architecture, when it comes to characterising in a precise way the content of this concept, one may hesitate to adopt views which are so overtly self-promoting. It is tempting indeed to sympathise with William Lescaze's claim that 'Organic is the word which Frank Lloyd Wright uses to describe his own architecture.'16 

Indeed, organicism is so favourably presented by Wright that, when adopting his view, it becomes problematic to fairly characterise inorganic  architecture.  If one were to look for an alternative to organicism, a candidate that would very likely come quickly to mind is functionalism. Indeed, so-called 'functionalist' architecture has been so frequently associated with the Modern Movement, the Bauhaus, the International Style and rationalism, which look clearly antithetical to Wright's organicism17 that it seems natural to look in this direction. This sounds however rather paradoxical given that Louis Sullivan is often considered as the founder of both organicism and functionalism and that the author of an important book devoted to functionalist theory has even presented organicism and functionalism as synonymous.18 Indeed, on the basis of our three Wrightian criteria, it is difficult to see any significant differences between organicism and functionalism.  First, it is clear that the primacy of function over form is the central feature of functionalism and that the commitment to satisfy needs and even to improve life has always been associated with both functionalism and organicism. The way to satisfy these needs may differ significantly between organicism and functionalism, but, taken as such, Wright's third criterion (centred on function and needs satisfaction) would hardly be of great help in distinguishing one from the other. Furthermore, since the function of a building, just like the human needs to which it is devoted, is normally determined by what goes on inside it, it is hard to imagine that a functionalist would not agree with Lao Tze and Wright that the construction of a building has primarily to be determined by 'the space within to be lived in'. Consequently, the second Wrightian criterion does not seem to be any more helpful in our attempt to distinguish functionalism from organicism. Finally, given that functional adaptation is a key feature of living organisms as understood by biological science, it would sound odd to resort to the first Wrightian criterion and contrast functionalism with the smooth functioning of nature and life. Bauhaus-founder Walter Gropius, who is often taken as representative of functionalism, not only promoted 'the social aim of improving the life of the community'19 with as much conviction as Wright, but early in his career characterised houses as 'coherent organisms'20 and later claimed that 'good architecture should be a projection of life itself'21 and also that the Bauhaus Masters 'sought the vital spark of life behind life's ever-changing forms'.22  Finally, it is surely not Wright's insistence on associating his own cult of nature with integrity and truth23 that can distinguish his views from those of Gropius. For Gropius also invokes truth and honesty,24 and does so even in relation with the importance of organic proportions for architecture.25 Just like organicism, functionalism is a philosophical approach according to which architecture can be called modern by being an honest expression of life itself and by proceeding from inside out in its attempt to satisfy needs and therefrom to improve the happiness of individual people and of society on the whole. But, when two concepts in the critical vocabulary of a field which are perceived as opposites turn out to be characterised in the same terms, something is wrong with the criteria adopted in order to identifying them. Thus, it seems appropriate at this point to turn towards different criteria in order to characterise more properly what is meant by these two evasive concepts.

Three different criteria
Incidentally, very few relatively systematic attempts to characterise what organicism amounts to have been published. Bruno Zevi's short essay on organicism26 is one of the scarce exceptions to this rule. After a brief evocation of a few dicta about organicism, Zevi turns to an analysis of Modern Building, a book by historian of architecture Curt Behrendt which does not explicitly concern the question of organicism.27 Nonetheless, scanning Behrendt's book, Zevi finds no less than fifteen criteria according to which the kind of architecture that he considers to be representative of organicism can be contrasted with unambiguously inorganic architecture. It would be unnecessarily fastidious to quote here the complete list of these criteria, but it might be useful to bring them under three main headings: (1) the role of intuition and imagination as contrasted with reason and analytic thought, (2) the valorisation of singularity, irregularity, individuality and dynamism in contrast with universality, regularity and immutability, and (3) the valorisation of complexity (in a sense akin to that given to this word by Robert Venturi in Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture) and multiformity in contrast with formal simplicity and sobriety. One must admit that these criteria are much more instructive than those I have attributed to Wright when it comes to contrasting organicism and functionalism. Indeed, intuitive imagination, individuality and complexity can be associated with organicism whereas reason, universality and sobriety evokes functionalism reasonably well.

However, since Behrendt-Zevi's three criteria have little to do with Wright's, the relation between them remains unspecified. In this connection, a building which fulfils Behrendt-Zevi's criteria of organicism perfectly well could nonetheless be totally antithetical to what I have called Wright's three criteria for organicism. Thus, it would be odd to consider such a building as representative of organicism given its non-compliance with these last criteria. Let us consider, for example, Mendelsohn's Einstein Tower in Potsdam. The quite individualised and highly complex design of this building seems to be the fruit of intuition rather than being ruled by rational principles. Thus, according to each of Behrendt-Zevi's criteria, such a building would be the very antipode of an inorganic one and, at first glance, it could therefore qualify as a piece of organic architecture. Yet, it is a building which is clearly sculptural in character; moreover, its form does not seem to have been dictated by its function and is more spontaneously associated with art than with nature. Consequently, such a building could not correctly be characterised as organicist since it contradicts each one of Wright's criteria. Conversely, satisfying Behrendt-Zevi's criteria of inorganic architecture is not sufficient to qualify a building as functionalist. Indeed, certain monumental piece of architecture, say, Aldo Rossi's cubic ossuary for the cemetery of Modena or even the Egyptian Pyramids, which were designed according to highly rational principles and which feature pure sober and universal geometrical forms, would be clearly inorganic buildings according to these criteria. But, given their relatively non-functional design28 adopted in order to convey a sculpturally impressive outward appearance without a special relation to the natural world, they could hardly be characterised as functionalist, at least if we agree with the above-mentioned idea that functionalist buildings are on the same side of Wright's criteria as organic ones.  Naturally, no one would be surprised to observe that many buildings such as Mendelsohn' tower as well as Rossi's ossuary can be classified neither as organicist nor functionalist. Nonetheless, insofar as we consider it important to understand what one means when one classifies a building as belonging to either of these categories, it seems to be worthwhile to restructure in a more manageable fashion the two sets of criteria that we have considered up to now.


Restructuring the two sets of criteria
It is largely because, according to the criteria adopted, they can be considered either as opposites or as synonymus that categories like 'organicism' and 'functionalism' are often perceived as vague and confusing. However, the confusion is chiefly attributable to the fact that, in spite of their largely overlapping contents, it is widely held that they should be contrasted in a binary fashion with allegedly homogeneous negative categories like 'inorganic' and 'non-functionalist' respectively. Matters become less confusing with the introduction of two complementary categories which allow us to restructure these oppositions. On the one hand, the sort of building exemplified by the Einstein Tower which is clearly neither functionalist, at least according to Behrendt-Zevi's criteria, nor organicist, at least according to Wright's criteria, is the very paragon of 'expressionist' architecture. While normally associated with Northern European architecture of the early twentieth century, the concept of expressionism is sometimes used to refer to some specific qualities of any piece of architecture. According to Dennis Sharp, this concept is 'largely retrospective' and has roots in late twentieth-century movements like National Romanticism and Art Nouveau.29 According to Wolfgang Pehnt, whose book suggests that expressionism is closely related to fantastic architecture,30 Henry Van de Velde even referred to 'the eccentric expressionism of Gothic or Indian architecture'.31 For Peter Collins, expressionism designates the trend to build symbolically-shaped buildings introduced by Ledoux in the eighteenth century.32 Thus, as illustrated by such judgements, this concept is frequently used to characterise a certain orientation of architecture which has to be more precisely specified.

On the other hand, buildings like Rossi's ossuary which are unequivocally inorganic, yet nonetheless non-functionalist, correspond typically enough to what is usually described as a 'formalist' piece of architecture. Even if, by contrast with our other three labels, what is called 'formalism' does not correspond to a relatively well-identified movement in the history of architecture, the term is commonly used in a sense which implies that a primacy is given to the shape (the form) of a building over its function.33 To describe this kind of architecture, it could have been equally possible to resort to the term 'rationalism' but, while there is good reason to disentangle rationalism from functionalism,34 the term 'rationalism' is still too frequently used in a sense which includes functionalism as well as formalism.  It is true that this last term itself is not always clearly opposed to 'functionalism' 35 but both its etymology and the way these terms are ordinarily understood36 suggest that formalism should be opposed to functionalism just as form is opposed to function. In any case, the aim of the present paper is not as much to alter the scope of any of these concept as it is to describe their usual meaning with the help of a consistent set of criteria and, in this fashion, to contrast more clearly their respective connotations. 

Thus, if we were to consider only the fact that both formalism and expressionism stand in opposition to the features which, according to Wright, characterise organicism, we should have trouble distinguishing between them. Indeed, with respect to 'formalism' and 'expressionism', it is reasonable to say that in contrast with organicism and functionalism (1) they are oriented towards the realisation of artistic aims rather than being submitted to the requirements of life and nature,37 (2) rather than with the inner development of space, they are associated with sculptural and often monumental forms which normally have to be appreciated from the outside38 and (3) they give to such forms a primacy over pure function insofar as such a primacy is possible in architecture.39 However, in spite of these common oppositions to what defines organicism (and indirectly functionalism) according to the Wrightian criteria, the fundamental differences between formalism and expressionism become clear when the Behrendt-Zevi's criteria are taken into consideration. Indeed, formalism is a way of thinking which is generally associated with reason, universality and sobriety whereas expressionism is associated with intuitive imagination, individuality and complexity. On the other hand, as we have seen, when it comes to distinguishing either expressionism from organicism or formalism from functionalism, it is what I have called Wright's criteria that become illuminating. 

The fourfold set of possibilities generated by such an application of these criteria can be presented in the form of a matrix which makes it evident that, strictly speaking, the antithesis of organicism is formalism40 whereas functionalism should be opposed to expressionism rather than to anything else.41
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